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Abstract 
Research summary: We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both 
encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide 
job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, 
we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use 
of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively 
associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, 
firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO 
compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge 
resources in diversified firms. 
Managerial summary: A firm’s knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are 
firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In 
particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its 
CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job 
security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less 
likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the 
deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job 
security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets.  
 
Keywords: firm-specific knowledge, CEO compensation, CEO dismissal, specific human capital, 
knowledge structure 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the resource‐based theory, a firm’s resources, especially its knowledge resources, are 
fundamental determinants of the firm’s economic performance (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 
1984). A firm’s knowledge resources can be broadly classified into firm‐specific knowledge and general 
knowledge (Becker, 1975). Compared to general knowledge, firm‐specific knowledge is often tailor‐made 
for firm‐specific situations, which makes it very difficult to be imitated and substituted by rivals (Helfat, 
1994; Pennings, Lee, and Van, 1998). Moreover, as rents generated from firm‐specific knowledge is 
likely to be shared between the firm and its key members (Becker, 1975; Hashimoto, 1981), firms are able 
to appropriate at least a proportion of the rents generated from firm‐specific knowledge. Thus, the 
possession of unique and valuable firm‐specific knowledge, instead of general knowledge, forms the basis 
for superior performance and long‐term competitive advantage (Helfat, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
Also emphasized in the resource‐based theory is the important role of top managers, especially the CEOs, 
in discovering and developing as well as deploying firm resources in order for the firm to achieve 
resource‐ or knowledge‐based advantages (Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and 
Cannella, 2009). Holding CEO capabilities as well as other managerial factors constant, we argue that a 
firm’s knowledge structure—or the level of firm‐specificity in the firm’s knowledge assets—may affect 
the extent to which the firm needs the CEO to invest in firm‐specific human capital. In particular, the 
accumulation and deployment of firm‐specific knowledge assets often require top managers to engage in 
firm‐specific effort by acquiring the corresponding specialized managerial skills. In addition, establishing 
stable CEO‐employee relationship is especially critical in such firms as it helps facilitate mutual 
understanding and trust, and thereby, effectively motivate the key technical employees to exert effort in 
the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge. 
Given the importance of CEO’s specialized human capital in deploying firm‐specific knowledge, we 
argue that firms may resort to appropriate employment arrangements for CEOs, in order for them to be 
motivated to invest in specialized skills. In particular, we expect that a firm’s knowledge structure would 
have implications for both key CEO compensation design and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. CEO 
compensation design, such as a greater use of restricted stocks, provides incentives for CEOs to stay in 
the firm (or discourage CEOs to voluntarily leave the firm) and to have a longer time horizon in making 
specialized human capital investments. Another way for the firms to motivate their CEOs is to retain them 
by providing the CEOs with greater job security, indicated by a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal ex 
post. Job security as a result of board retention efforts reduces the CEOs’ risk of losing the value of their 
specific human capital investments, giving the CEOs the assurance of value capture from their specialized 
investments. Accordingly, we expect to observe a higher proportion of restricted stocks in CEO 
compensation for firms with a high degree of firm‐specific knowledge assets. Moreover, such firms are 
more likely to have a lower CEO dismissal rate, even when the firm is experiencing poor financial 
performance. 
To further untangle these arguments, we additionally examine the role of diversification in moderating the 
relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation 
contracts and that between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO dismissal. In highly diversified firms, CEOs 
are often far removed from the operational details and from the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge 
resources. Thus, CEOs have less opportunity to acquire skills specialized to firm knowledge assets. It 
then follows that there is less need for the firm to provide incentives for its CEO to specialize. In contrast, 
in the case of focused or relatedly diversified firms, CEOs are more directly involved in knowledge assets 
deployment, which increases the need for the CEO to specialize. Thus, we expect that both the 
relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and ratio of restricted stocks in compensation design and 
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that between firm‐specific knowledge and the intent of the board to retain the CEO (i.e., a lower 
likelihood of CEO dismissal) are stronger for less diversified firms. 
This study intends to make several contributions. First, it contributes to the resource‐based theory of the 
firm (e.g., Barney, 1991; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Peteraf, 1993) by providing a linkage between a firm’s 
resources and top management employment arrangements. In particular, we develop the argument that a 
firm’s knowledge resource structure affects firm employment arrangements in terms of both top 
managers’ compensation design and job security. One important implication of the argument is that for a 
firm characterized with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge, it is very important to provide incentives 
for their CEOs to stay in the firm through compensation design and to maintain leadership continuity 
through a lower CEO dismissal (Hoskisson et al., 1999). 
Second, relatedly, it contributes to the strategic leadership literature with a focus on the CEO 
compensation and CEO succession (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). By documenting 
the influence of firm knowledge structure on both compensation design and CEO career trajectory, our 
article provides fresh angles to understand the antecedents of CEO compensation and succession. 
Moreover, since we consider both CEO compensation and CEO succession as essential key elements of 
employment arrangements that provide incentives for CEOs to specialize, we are among the first studies 
to combine these two areas under one unified framework. Toward this end, our article has also become 
one of the first studies that integrate prior research on resource‐based view with strategic leadership 
literature. 
Third, by examining how the level of corporate diversification influences the need for the CEO’s 
investment in specialized skills, and thereby, moderates the key relationships argued, we further 
contribute to the literatures by introducing the role of firm structure and scope in firms’ employment 
arrangements for their CEOs. We argue that for a given level of firm‐specificity in knowledge assets, the 
opportunity for CEOs to invest in specialized skills may vary with the level of corporate diversification, 
which affects CEO responsibilities, and accordingly, their employment arrangements. While previous 
studies primarily focused on the direct effects of corporate diversification on various strategy and 
performance outcomes (e.g., Miller, 2006; Rumelt, 1982), our study provides insights into how corporate 
diversification may interact with a firm’s knowledge structure to affect employment arrangements. 
Last, this study also extends the arguments of agency theory and corporate governance, which falls short 
in discussing how firm resources may play a role in affecting the relationship between shareholders and 
top managers (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). This study 
shows how incorporating a firm’s knowledge structure into the analysis of managerial employment 
arrangements (i.e., restricted stock in CEO compensation and career stability in our article) may provide 
important implications for the agency relationships. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Firm‐specific versus general knowledge 
In resource‐based models of the firm, the basis for superior performance is possession of unique and 
valuable firm‐specific resources (Barney, 1991). A resource is considered specific to a firm if its value to 
the firm exceeds its second‐best use value in an alternative business setting. Among the pool of resources 
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examined, a firm’s knowledge assets are generally considered to be most critical for firm survival and 
long‐run success (Helfat, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996). 
In general, both firm‐specific and general knowledge are considered critical for firm operations. Firms 
often have components of both firm‐specific and general knowledge and they only differ in the degree of 
firm‐specificity in firm knowledge assets, which falls on a continuum. A strategy toward a greater level of 
firm‐specific knowledge is generally associated with higher risk, since the economic value of firm‐
specific knowledge is ultimately influenced by exogenous factors such as market conditions (Barney, 
2001; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000; Priem and Butler, 2001). As it is more difficult for firm‐specific 
knowledge to find alternative settings where the knowledge can be applied, in case there is a misfit 
between firm‐specific knowledge and consumer preferences and technologies, it can be detrimental for 
firm performance and survival (Anderson and Tushman, 1990, 2001; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007). 
However, once firm‐specific knowledge proves valuable in the market, it has a greater potential to 
generate superior economic performance for a firm than general knowledge does. Valuable firm‐specific 
knowledge is difficult to be imitated by rivals as it is is often related to the alteration and enhancement of 
existing technologies and operational processes, which are tailor‐made for firm‐specific situations (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2004; Helfat, 1994). For example, in the early stage of the printer industry, Epson applied 
Piezoelectric technology to develop its series of printers, while Hewlett‐Packard centered on thermal ink 
jet technology for its product development. Since these two firms were major players in the industry that 
had dominant technology bases compared with many other firms, the series of innovative knowledge of 
the two firms developed based on their distinct technologies are considered highly firm‐specific (Wang 
and Chen, 2010). Another example of firm‐specific knowledge can be found in the petroleum industry. 
Due to the different geographical features of each reservoir in the petroleum industry, the innovation of 
new ways to extract additional crude oil from existing reservoirs is often not transferable across firms, 
and thus, has firm‐specific components (Helfat, 1994). 
In order to imitate a firm’s firm‐specific knowledge, other firms will have to obtain not only the 
knowledge per se, but also the bases, parameters, and other firm‐specific features or the whole system on 
which the knowledge is built. Moreover, while rents generated from general knowledge is likely to be 
appropriated by the key managers and employees who own or have control of such knowledge, rents 
generated from firm‐specific knowledge is likely to be shared between the firm and its key members 
(Becker, 1975; Hashimoto, 1981). As a result, firms are able to appropriate at least a proportion of the 
rents generated from firm‐specific knowledge. Therefore, compared with general knowledge, firm‐
specific knowledge is more likley to generate long‐run superior economic performance for the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Ghemawat, 1986). Consistent with this argument, some previous studies have found that a 
higher level of self‐citations of a firm’s own patents, as an indicator of the level of firm specificity of 
knowledge, is associated with the greater economic value of the firm (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; 
Wang and Chen, 2010; Wang, He, and Mahoney, 2009). 
 
Firm‐specific knowledge and CEO specialized skills 
Because firm‐specific knowledge tends to be “sticky”—there are significant costs associated with 
separating it from the firm that owns them, the decision to pursue a knowledge development strategy that 
emphasize firm‐specific knowledge implies an irreversible commitment by the firm (Ghemawat and Del 
Sol, 1998). The cost associated with abandoning such firm‐specific knowledge creates a tendency toward 
 5 
 
 
persistence or commitment in a company’s strategy. Such a need for commitment can be shown in the 
firm’s tendency to build long‐term relationships with its key stakeholders, including its top managers. 
More specifically, the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge assets often require top managers to engage 
in a greater level of firm‐specific effort by acquiring the corresponding specialized managerial skills.1 
First, developing and deploying firm‐specific knowledge is often accompanied by a local search based on 
a firm’s existing knowledge stock. A successful local search, in turn, requires skills specialized to each 
firm setting. Although top managers may not need to invest in as much specialized technical skills as 
R&D employees do, they still need to have an understanding of the technical knowledge involved to not 
only “know the right questions to ask his subordinates,” but also know “how to evaluate the answers” 
(Castanias and Helfat, 1991; Katz, 1974). A similar line of argument can also be found from the 
perspective of the resource‐based view of the firm, previous literature has argued that the effectiveness of 
firm knowledge investment is affected by top managers’ skills in searching for superior opportunity set 
for the firm’s knowledge assets (Kor and Mahoney, 2005; Penrose, 1959). The more firm‐specific are the 
managers’ skills, the more precisely can the managers assess the likelihood of success among multiple 
avenues of application of firm knowledge assets. Accordingly, top managers with specialized skills are 
better able to devote resources to those avenues that are most likely to achieve higher returns from their 
firms’ unique knowledge base (Kor and Mahoney, 2005). 
Therefore, when a firm has higher level of firm‐specific knowledge assets, not only are the key technical 
employees involved in making corresponding specific human capital investments, but also the 
complementary managerial skills of its top managers are likely to increase in specificity. Consistent with 
this view, Gabarro (2010) suggests that the specific skills of employees and top managers are often highly 
correlated. The co‐movement of developing firm‐specific knowledge in all levels of employees not only 
facilitate strategy implementation, but also enable top managers to better evaluate their subordinates’ 
performance and to build relationship with key technical employees. 
Key technical employees are often directly involved in the process of deploying knowledge‐based firm‐
specific assets. Their incentive in the knowledge development process is another critical issue that needs 
the firm to pay serious attention to (Wang et al., 2009). In addition to an economic‐based incentive 
mechanism, good employee relations are an important relationship‐based employee governance 
mechanism that helps effectively motivate employees to exert efforts in the rent generation process of 
firm‐specific knowledge. It then follows that firms with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge often 
have a greater need for top managers to build close relations with key technical employees to obtain the 
mutual understanding and trust necessary to motivate such employees to successfully implement the 
firm’s strategies (Wang et al., 2009). Manager‐employee relationship asset itself is likely to be specialized 
to the particular firm context (Williamson, 1985). In this case, specialized managerial skills can be 
interpreted as a relationship‐specific investment, which is embedded in the particular firm context. 
In sum, accumulating valuable firm‐specific knowledge itself, even if guarded by intellectual property 
rights, is not enough to support a significant competitive advantage. In order to create a long‐term 
competitive advantage, these firms require their top managers, especially its CEO, to invest in specialized 
skills, coupled with the management capability to effectively coordinate and combine firm‐specific 
knowledge with other critical human resources. Without such specialized skills of CEOs, companies may 
                                                            
1 What is central to our argument is the relative, instead of absolute, level of CEO specialized skills. Our key 
propositions will hold, as long as the need for CEOs to invest in specialized skills is relatively greater in firms with a 
high level of firm‐specific knowledge than firms with a low firm‐specific knowledge. 
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accumulate a large stock firm‐specific knowledge, but still not enjoy any sustainable performance 
advantages (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). 
The discussion above suggests that there is a greater requirement for a firm’s CEO to invest in specialized 
human capital, if the firm implements a strategy toward the accumulation and deployment of firm‐specific 
knowledge. Similar to other types of firm‐specific investments, CEOs’ specialized skills are imperfectly 
redeployable or are valued less in the external labor market than within the firm (Becker, 1975; Castanias 
and Helfat, 1991; Williamson, 1985). Thus, due to the concern for losing the value of their specialized 
human capital in the case of being dismissed, the CEOs are typically reluctant to make such investments 
ex ante. Indeed, previous research has found that CEOs with more firm‐specific skills are likely to be paid 
less in the external market. For example, Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) found that there is a 
significant pay discount for CEOs who are specialists in the industries, compared to peer CEOs who are 
more generalists. Therefore, a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has a greater need to 
induce its CEO to make specialized human capital investments, and therefore, has different employment 
arrangements with its CEO. Below we discuss two related elements of employment arrangements firms 
may adopt to induce CEO investments. The first is compensation design, such as the use of a higher 
proportion of restricted stocks, to encourage a CEO to stay and make long‐time commitment to the firm, 
thereby reducing his or her likelihood of voluntary departure. The second is to directly reduce the risk 
associated with CEO specialized investments by providing the CEOs with job security, which reflects the 
intent of the board to retain the CEO and is manifested as a lower level of ex post CEO dismissal, or 
forced departure. 
 
Firm‐specific knowledge and CEO compensation design 
A typical mechanism that provides incentives for CEOs to make specialized investments is through some 
specific compensation design that is able to encourage CEO to stay longer in the firm and as a result to 
take a long‐term strategic perspective. The deployment of firm‐specific knowledge and investment in 
corresponding specialized skills are typically long term in nature. It takes time for managerial learning to 
become embedded in an organization, and to guide the subsequent learning and actions of other 
organizational members (Prietula and Simon, 1989). Thus, there are time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989) for new leaders to accumulate firm‐specific human capital. Therefore, when 
top managers make choices regarding firm‐specific versus general skills, they have more incentives to 
invest in firm‐specific skills (choosing the value enhancing long‐term strategy) if the firm adopts 
compensation design that attracts the CEOs to stay longer in the firm and encourage the CEOs to make 
strategic decisions with a longer time horizon (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Buck et al., 2003). In 
contrast, in the absence of such contracts, CEOs are more likely to choose short‐term strategy, and 
correspondingly, acquire general skills because doing so will enable them to receive attractive outside 
offers. 
Among various compensation components, restricted stocks are particularly helpful to achieve these 
purposes.2 Restricted stocks, together with options and long‐term incentive plans, are broadly considered 
as key components of long‐term compensation designs. Restricted stock has recently become a popular 
                                                            
2 Our additional analysis also discusses the use of long‐term compensation (including stock options, restricted 
stocks, and long‐term incentive plans) in the compensation design, which also helps to keep CEOs and encourage 
them to take a long‐term perspective of their strategic choices. Results are very consistent with those of restricted 
stocks. 
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alternative to stock options for executive compensation due to fewer issues related to valuation and 
income tax treatments (Damodaran, 2013; Deloitte, 2005; Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2009). Similar 
to options, restricted stocks have a vesting date that requires the granted individuals to stay with the firm 
for a period before they can exercise their rights. But different from options which have expiration dates, 
restricted stocks do not expire (Hodge et al., 2009). These features of restricted stocks allow it to function 
as an effective mechanism that facilitates CEO retention.3 
First, as the value of restricted stocks is forfeited if CEOs leave their companies before the end of the 
vesting period, CEOs with restricted stocks as compensation are more likely to stay with a firm, 
especially if it represents a large proportion of their overall wealth. Thus, a direct effect of paying CEOs 
with restricted stocks is that the CEOs are less likely to actively search for other opportunities in external 
market and voluntarily leave the firm. 
Second, the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation also influences the extent to which the CEOs 
take a long‐term perspective for firm strategy. Due to the claw back provision in the incentive design, 
CEOs cannot benefit immediately from short‐term share price movement. In addition, the nature of no 
expiration date for restricted stocks could especially encourage CEOs to focus on the fundamentals of the 
firm or on the development of core capabilities, which have an enduring impact on firm success. 
Therefore, for a firm with a high level of knowledge specificity, restricted stocks help motivate CEOs to 
allocate their personal efforts to acquire firm‐specific human capital and to build firm‐specific 
relationship with key technological employees. 
Furthermore, granting a CEO with a greater level of restricted stocks is likely to better align the firm’s 
interest with that of the CEO (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The board’s insufficient knowledge of the 
CEO’s effort in acquiring specialized skills may lead to an outcome control‐based compensation 
incentive—as opposed to behavior monitoring control—to induce cooperative effort of the CEO 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Ouchi, 1980).This is particularly so when resource compositions are characterized by 
high levels of firm‐specific knowledge resources, where the behavior of the CEO in acquiring 
corresponding firm‐specific skills is often more difficult to observe and measure. 
In sum, when a firm has a high level of firm‐specific knowledge, where the concern for CEO 
underinvestment is likely to be the greatest, the firm is more likely to use restricted stocks to provide 
incentives for the CEO to stay, to have a longer‐term horizon, and accordingly, more likely to engage in 
firm‐specific efforts. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1: The level of firm‐specific knowledge is positively associated with the use of restricted 
stocks in CEO compensation. 
                                                            
3 The use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation may raise the concern that it may turn away “good quality” 
CEOs. The argument is that the vesting restrictions associated with restricted stocks could lead managers to value 
such stocks less, and thus, to be less likely to join firms offering restricted stocks in compensation. We do not think 
this is a serious concern because, in the open executive market, if good quality managers discounted the value of 
restricted stocks, they could negotiate for other ways to make up for the value loss, for example, by requesting a 
greater number of stocks, options, or simply more bonuses, and so on. Just like stock options and other incentive‐
based pay that have been widely adopted in practice, the concern is not about whether they attract lower quality 
individuals, but more about how managerial behaviors may be distorted by high‐power incentives without proper 
governance structure (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). In this regard, restricted stocks could be better than options as 
managers with heavy loads of options may be encouraged to take extremely risky decision to increase stock price 
volatility that is likely to increase the option valuation but reduce the firm value. 
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Firm‐specific knowledge and CEO dismissal 
CEOs’ incentives to engage in firm‐specific efforts are not only influenced by their own intention to stay 
within their firm, as reflected in compensation through restricted stocks, but also influenced by the level 
of security they felt about their employment in the firm. This is because CEOs are concerned about the 
risk of losing the value of their specialized skills in case of being dismissed (Wang and Barney, 2006). 
Being specific to the current firm, such skills cannot be applied to an alternative business setting without 
losing at least some value. Accordingly, CEOs would be reluctant to make specific human capital 
investments, if the board does not have the intention to retain them, or the likelihood that they may be 
separated from the current firm setting is high. Similar concerns of managers or key employees about the 
risk associated with being separated from their firms have also been discussed in some previous studies 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1988; Schnitzer, 1995; Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Titman, 1984). For example, in 
the context of takeovers, target managers are likely to be dismissed and replaced by new ones (Walsh, 
1988). As a result, an acquirer company appropriates the rents of target managers. Anticipating the 
dismissal and expropriation of their rents, the relationship‐specific investments of the target managers will 
be too insignificant, which may offset the efficiency increase through the takeover (Schnitzer, 1995). 
Thus, in the employment arrangement, another approach for motivating CEOs to make specialized skills 
investment is to show the firms’ retention effort by increasing the CEOs’ job security, so that they will be 
less concerned about separation from the current firm. Prior research on job (in)security at the employee 
level has documented that job insecurity was found to be significantly linked with both psychological 
distress, such as feelings of anxiety, depression, and irritability, as well as physical distress, such as 
fatigue, headaches, and insomnia (Cooper and Melhuish, 1980; Hartley et al., 1991). In contrast, a sense 
of security positively influences individuals’ job attitude, increasing their organizational commitments 
and reducing their withdrawal behaviors (Ashford, Lee, and Bobko, 1989; Davy, Kinicki, and Scheck, 
1997; Sverke and Hellgren, 2002). For example, Foss and colleagues (Foss, 2003; Foss, Foss, and 
Vázquez, 2006) found that organizational commitment to a lower likelihood of project termination 
provides a greater sense of security to employees, leading to an increase in firm value through enhanced 
employee motivation and participation. Similarly, even at the apex of the organization, CEOs have stress 
and concern of being forced out, which will make their prior firm‐specific investment less valuable 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein, and Mooney, 2005; Mannor et al., 2016). Accordingly, to motivate CEOs to 
acquire specialized knowledge to create greater firm value, an effective way is to provide job security. 
Therefore, we expect that a firm with greater firm‐specific knowledge, which requires a high level of 
CEO specialized skills investment, is more likely to benefit from, and have a greater need of, maintaining 
a higher level of job security for CEOs. Other things being equal, boards will have a stronger intention to 
retain CEOs, which can be reflected in a subsequently lower likelihood of the CEOs being forced out, that 
is, CEO dismissal. We therefore predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The level of firm‐specific knowledge is negatively associated with CEO dismissal. 
Earlier research on CEO dismissal has often focused on the relationship between firm financial 
performance and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, and consistently found that CEOs of firms 
experiencing poor performance are more likely to be dismissed (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Denis 
and Kruse, 2000; Murphy, 1999; Weisbach, 1988). In these cases, the CEO is argued to hold 
responsibility for the poor firm performance (Crossland and Chen, 2013). But CEO dismissal could be a 
response to poor performance with a symbolic dimension containing the element of scapegoating, 
especially when the CEO has low discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). If the board shows strong 
 9 
 
 
intention to keep the CEO, CEO dismissal may not occur even in the case of poor performance. 
Therefore, extending our arguments above that firms with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge are 
more likely to retain their CEOs through providing them with job security, we would expect that the 
likelihood of a CEO is dismissed under poor financial performance should be mitigated for firms with a 
high level of firm‐specific knowledge. 
Hypothesis 2a: The level of firm‐specific knowledge weakens the negative relationship between firm 
financial performance and CEO dismissal. 
 
The moderating role of corporate diversification 
Our preceding argument is established on the premise that with an increase in firm‐specific knowledge, 
the firm needs to provide incentives and employment arrangements for its CEO to invest in more 
specialized skills. However, for a given level of firm‐specificity in knowledge assets, the opportunity for 
CEOs to invest in specialized skills may vary due to the differences across firms in terms of CEO 
responsibilities. We focus on one key factor of interest in the strategic management field—corporate 
diversification (Bettis and Hall, 1982; Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and 
discuss how the level of diversification influences the need for the CEO’s investment in specialized skills, 
and thereby, moderates the relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO dismissal. 
Diversified firms tend to have more executive levels (Gomez‐Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987) and larger 
and more complex organizational structures (Aggarwal, 1981). For example, an M‐form organization 
(Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975), which defines a set of management roles and relationships that 
emphasize delegation of authority to operating divisions, is a pervasive organizational structural form 
adopted by many large diversified companies. Thus, in a highly diversified firm, management of 
operational details is often dedicated to division managers. CEOs, on the other hand, are more tuned to 
manage corporate level activities, such as coordination among divisions and portfolio management (Hill 
and Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Michel and Hambrick, 1992). 
In contrast, in firms with low levels of diversification (focused or relatedly businesses), CEOs are 
typically more directly involved in firm or division operations and often manage the firm with a greater 
emphasis on strategic controls (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1990). This also means that there is greater need for the CEOs to have a better understanding of 
the divisions’ resources, operational details and strategies. In addition, in order to attain synergies among 
highly related businesses, the CEO must ensure coordination and cooperation between divisions by 
creating interdependent linkages among them (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, Johnson, and 
Moesel, 1994; Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Establishing and maintaining such company‐wide resource 
exchanges result in an active role by CEOs in establishing relationships with key knowledge employees. 
In sum, CEOs of less diversified firms have greater opportunity to acquire firm‐specific skills, either 
directly specialized to firm knowledge assets, or indirectly specialized to the unique relationship with the 
firms’ key employees. Accordingly, the need for a less diversified firm to use restricted stocks to 
encourage its CEO to stay is higher. In contrast, in a highly diversified firm where CEOs have fewer 
opportunities to acquire firm‐specific skills, the firm is less likely to use such compensation design. Thus, 
in a highly diversified firm, the relation between firm‐specific knowledge and long‐term compensation 
will be weaker. Therefore, we predict: 
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Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO compensation with 
restricted stocks becomes weaker (stronger) with a higher (lower) level of firm diversification. 
Similarly, a lower level of requirement for specialized skills of CEOs in a highly diversified firm further 
reduces the need for the firm to provide its CEO with job security, thus reducing the costs associated with 
making commitments as well as the costs of dismissing the CEO. Therefore, the level of firm 
diversification will also affect the relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO dismissal. 
While there is a negative relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO dismissal, we posit that 
this relationship would be weakened by the level of firm diversification. 
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO dismissal becomes 
weaker (stronger) with a higher (lower) level of firm diversification. 
 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
Our initial sample selection was based on observations for all firms in the Execucomp database for the 
period from 1993 to 2001.4 A turnover event was identified if there was a change in a firm’s CEO in a 
particular year based on Execucomp. The Factiva news database was then searched to obtain information 
on the exact announcement date of the succession and on whether it was a forced or a voluntary turnover 
(Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; Parrino, 1997).56 The data was then merged with the NBER patents file 
assembled by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), which was used to measure firm‐specific knowledge. 
Board and CEO duality data were collected from Compact Disclosure. CEO compensation and CEO 
ownership data were extracted from the Execucomp, firm diversification data from Compustat’s industrial 
segment file, and analyst coverage information from IEBS database. Finally, Compustat and CRSP 
databases were used to construct accounting and stock return variables respectively. After merging the 
major data sets and deleting observations with missing values for the key variables, the final panel data 
set contained 972 firms and 4,390 firm‐year observations for a sample period of 1993 through 2001. 
Measurements 
Restricted stock was defined as the value of restricted stock granted to the CEO during the year divided 
by the total annual compensation. 
                                                            
4 Execucomp data began in 1992, and NBER patent citation data, which is the source of data for our key measure of 
firm‐specific knowledge, was available between 1976 and 2006. Since both backward and forward citations are 
needed for our measure of firm‐specific knowledge and truncation problems are serious for patent forward citations, 
we chose 2001 as the ending year of our sample, which provided us at least five years of forward citations. 
5 The classification of turnovers into forced and voluntary follows Parrino (1997): All departures for which the press 
reports that the CEO is fired, is forced out, or retires/resigns due to pressure are classified as forced. All other 
departures for CEOs above and including age 60 are classified as voluntary. Departures for CEOs below age 60 are 
reviewed further and classified as forced if either the press does not report the reason as death, poor health, or the 
acceptance of another position (including being the chair of the board), or the press reports that the CEO is retiring, 
but does not announce the retirement at least six months before the succession. Finally, the cases classified as forced 
can be reclassified if the reports convincingly explain the departure as due to reasons that are unrelated to the firm's 
activities. This careful classification scheme is necessary since CEOs are rarely openly fired from their positions. 
CEO turnovers caused by mergers and spin‐offs are excluded from the analysis. 
6 We thank Professors Jenter and Kanaan for sharing their forced CEO turnover data. 
 11 
 
 
CEO dismissal was a dummy variable coded as 1 if there was a forced turnover in a firm’s CEO in a 
particular year according to the classification procedure described earlier. Otherwise, this variable was 
coded as 0. 
Firm‐specific knowledge was measured using patents and their citations. Patents represent an important 
component of a firm’s knowledge assets and patent citations provide direct evidence of the path of 
knowledge flow and spillovers. Each patent’s citations are typically evaluated carefully by patent 
examiners in order to avoid inappropriate citations and the exclusion of relevant citations. The data enable 
the tabulation of both citations that are made within the same firm (self‐citations) and those made by other 
firms (external citations). If the amount of patents represents a firm’s stock of knowledge resources, and 
patent citations represent the flow of the knowledge resources, then the frequency with which a firm’s 
existing patents cite its own previous patents indicates the degree to which the firm’s new knowledge is 
built on its own existing knowledge base. It can then be inferred that the higher the percentage of internal 
knowledge accumulation as represented by self‐patent citations, the more likely that the firm’s knowledge 
assets are firm specific. Accordingly, we built on previous studies (Hall et al., 2005; Wang and Chen, 
2010; Wang et al., 2009) to generate a proxy for the level of firm‐specific knowledge as follows: 
Firm-specific Knowledge = Share of backward 
self-citations (over total citations) made by the focal firm ∗ the extent to which these self-cited 
patents are subsequently cited by the focal firm 
Specifically, the measure is the share of self‐citations made, calculated by counting all citations made in a 
firm’s new patents in a certain year that cited the firm’s own previous patents, then dividing this number 
by the total number of citations made by all the firm’s new patents in that year. It is further adjusted by a 
weight, the extent to which the self‐cited patents are subsequently cited by the focal firm, which is the 
fraction of the total forward citations of these self‐cited patents that are generated by the focal firm 
(versus by other firms). The weight is added to address the concern that, “even though a firm cites its own 
previous patents, if these previous patents are also widely cited by other firms (which makes the weight 
rather small), the degree of firm‐specificity in knowledge…should be discounted” (Wang et al., 2009: 
929). 
We constructed two standard measures of firm diversification: (1) number of Business Segments, which 
was the number of different businesses in which the firm operates; (2) one minus Herfindahl index, which 
was calculated as the sum of squares of segment sales divided by the square of firm sales, thus a greater 
score suggests a higher level of diversification. To test the interaction effect between firm‐specific 
knowledge and diversification, we mean‐centered these variables to ease interpretation of results and 
address potential multicollinearity. 
We also included two measures of firm financial performance. Our primary measure is prior year 
industry‐adjusted stock return (Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001; Wiersema and Zhang, 2011), computed 
as the firm’s stock return minus the median industry stock return. The median industry return is calculated 
using all CRSP firms in the focal firm’s two‐digit Standard Industrial Classification industry (excluding 
the focal firm). In addition, we also included return on asset (ROA) (similarly adjusted by industry) as it 
is a very commonly used accounting‐based measure of firm financial performance. 
In addition to the above key explanatory variables, we also included a series of control variables, 
including CEO characteristics, board characteristics, and firm‐level variables such as R&D and firm size. 
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Since previous studies found that the compensation design and the probability of CEO dismissal varied 
across CEO tenure and age ( Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Ocasio, 1994; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 
2010), we also included these two variables in the regression to control their effects. As the stock 
ownership of the firm’s CEO might increase a CEO’s power, and thus, influence the compensation design 
and decrease the probability of CEO dismissal (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Huson et al., 2001), we controlled for CEO stock ownership, measured as the fraction of stock shares held 
by the CEO. Similarly, we also included CEO duality, as a CEO who is also the board chair tends to have 
greater power. CEO duality was coded as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is the board chair, and 
0 otherwise. 
In addition to CEO characteristics, we also included two board level variables that may influence the 
CEO employment arrangements: board size and fraction of outside directors (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Weisbach, 1988; Yermack, 1996). Board size was measured as the total number of directors on the board. 
Outside directors was measured as a ratio of nonexecutive directors on the board. We also controlled for 
the effect of Analyst recommendation as prior research suggested that it had a significant impact on CEO 
career trajectory (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). In particular, Analyst recommendation was measured by 
the weighted average of all analyst recommendations of a firm. And the higher the score, the more it is 
oriented to “buy” recommendation. Last, we controlled for two firm level variables, R&D intensity and 
Firm size. Firm size was measured by the natural logarithm of annual sales of the firm (Huson et al., 
2001). R&D intensity of a firm was calculated as the annual R&D expenditure scaled by firm size (e.g., 
Griliches, 1981; Hall et al., 2005). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for our sample. In line with previous studies, the 
mean value of the restricted stock was 0.035 (Murphy, 1999). The frequency of CEO dismissal was 2.3 
percent of all firm‐year observations in our sample, similar to what had been reported in previous studies 
(e.g., Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). Also in line of prior research, the average value of the firm‐specific 
knowledge variable was 0.023. Similarly, the statistics of other variables were generally consistent with 
the literature (e.g., Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). As expected, restricted stock 
was positively correlated with firm‐specific knowledge, while CEO dismissal was negatively correlated 
with firm‐specific knowledge. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
To test our hypotheses, we ran regressions with restricted stock and CEO dismissal as the dependent 
variables. Table 2 presents the results with restricted stock as the dependent variable. In Model (1), we 
included only control variables. Restricted stock was found to be significantly and negatively related to 
industry‐adjusted stock return, CEO tenure, CEO stock ownership, analyst recommendation, and R&D 
intensity. In addition, bigger firms or firms with a bigger board size tended to grant more restricted stock 
to their CEOs. 
We introduced firm‐specific knowledge variable in Model (2). The coefficient of firm‐specific knowledge 
was positive and significant (β = 0.102, p < 0.01), providing support for our Hypothesis 1. In terms of 
economic significance, a one‐standard‐deviation increase in the firm‐specific knowledge (0.04) led to an 
increase of 0.004 in restricted stock, representing more than 11 percent of the mean of restricted stock for 
our sample. 
Models (3)–(6) showed the results with the two diversification measures added. In Models (3) and (5), we 
included the main effect of firm diversification measured by the number of business segments (Model 
[3]), and by one minus Herfindahl index (Model [5]), respectively. In Models (4) and (6), we added the 
interaction terms between measures of firm diversification and firm‐specific knowledge, in order to test 
the moderating hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) that the positive effect of firm‐specific knowledge on restricted 
stock would be weakened if the firm was more diversified. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the coefficients 
of both interaction terms were negative and significant (β = −0.068, p < 0.05 in Model [4]; and β = 
−0.274, p < 0.10 in Model [6]). 
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Table 2. OLS regression to predict the use of restricted stock in compensation design a,b,c,d 
 
We used results in Model (4) to illustrate the practical implication of the moderating effect of 
diversification. First, we computed the high and low values of number of business segment by adding and 
subtracting standard deviation from its mean, which were 1.311 and −1.311, respectively. At the high 
value of the variable (i.e., highly diversified companies), the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on 
restricted stock was −0.007 (=0.082 – 0.068 * 1.311). This effect became 0.171 at the low value of the 
variable (i.e., relatively more focused firms). Similarly, the high and low values of one minus Herfindahl 
index were 0.275 and −0.275, respectively. The effect of firm‐specific knowledge on restricted stock was 
0.009 at the high value of the variable, and 0.159 at the low value. 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 4, we used logit model with CEO dismissal as the dependent variable. Table 3 
presents the main results. In Model (1), we included only control variables. CEO dismissal was 
significantly and negatively related to industry‐adjusted stock return, analyst recommendation, CEO age, 
tenure, and CEO duality. These regression results were largely consistent with the prior literature. 
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Table 3. Logistic regression to predict the likelihood of CEO dismissal a, b, b, d 
 
We introduced firm‐specific knowledge variable in Model (2). The coefficient of firm‐specific knowledge 
was negative and significant (β = −7.535, p < 0.05). We further examined the marginal effect of firm‐
specific knowledge on the probability of CEO dismissal at the mean value of all variable. The marginal 
value was −0.082, which was significant at p < 0.05. In addition, we found that the predicted probability 
of CEO dismissal decreased by 0.35 percent (which was a 15% decrease from the average dismissal rate 
of 2.3%) when firm‐specific knowledge increased by one standard deviation around the mean (at the 
mean value of all other variables).7 Indeed, this effect was greater than that of CEO age, CEO duality, 
and analyst recommendation. Overall, these results were consistent with Hypothesis 2, which states that 
firm‐specific knowledge is negatively associated with CEO dismissal. 
Hypothesis 2a suggests that firm‐specific knowledge may negatively affect the performance‐CEO 
dismissal sensitivity. The test results for this hypothesis are shown in Table 4. Specifically, Model (2) 
reported that the interaction between firm‐specific knowledge and stock return‐based performance 
measure was positive and significant, suggesting that although market performance was negatively related 
to CEO dismissal (i.e., poor performance increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal), such an effect was 
weakened if the firm had high level of firm‐specific knowledge. This was in line with our argument. In 
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addition, when industry‐adjusted ROA was used as an alternative performance measure in Models (3) and 
(4), we also found similar results supporting Hypothesis 2a. 
Table 4. Moderating effects of firm‐specific knowledge on the relationships between firm performance 
and CEO dismissal a,b 
 
Models (3)–(6) in Table 3 show the results with the two diversification measures added to test Hypothesis 
4. In Models (3) and (5), we included the main effect of firm diversification measured by the number of 
business segments (Model [3]) and by one minus Herfindahl index (Model [5]), respectively. Both 
coefficients were negative and significant (p < 0.05 in both cases), a result consistent with Berry et al. 
(2006). In Models (4) and (6), we added the interaction terms between measures of firm diversification 
and firm‐specific knowledge in order to test the moderating hypothesis that the negative effect of firm‐
specific knowledge on CEO dismissal would be weakened if the firm was more diversified. Consistent 
with our Hypothesis 4, the coefficients of both interaction terms were positive and significant (β = 4.524, 
p < 0.05 in Model [4]; and β = 26.140, p < 0.05 in Model [5]). 
Several scholars recommended a set of best practices to test and interpret the interaction effect in logistic 
regressions (Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). Using the statistical procedures and the 
STATA codes suggested by Wiersema and Bowen (2009), we examined the effect of the firm‐specific 
knowledge on the probability of CEO dismissal for low and high levels of firm diversification (Table 5). 
We found that in both measures of firm diversifications, the negative effect of the firm‐specific 
knowledge on the probability of CEO dismissal was greater when the level of firm diversification was 
low (marginal effect = −0.355 and −0.376, respectively, p < 0.01 in both cases) than when it was high 
(marginal effect = −0.029 and −0.003, respectively, n.s. in both cases). This again supported Hypothesis 
4. 
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Table 5. Moderating effect analysis of firm diversification on the marginal effect of firm‐specific 
knowledge on the probability of CEO dismissal a,b 
 
 
Robustness tests and supplementary analyses 
We did several additional analyses to ensure that our results were robust. First, extending the existing 
arguments, we could expect that the level of firm‐specific knowledge not only influences CEO 
employment arrangements, it may also influence how a new CEO is selected. Our theory would suggest 
that firms with higher firm‐specific knowledge are more likely to hire CEO internally (insider succession) 
than externally (outsider succession). To empirically test this conjecture, we further decomposed CEO 
dismissal into two categories: CEO dismissal followed by inside succession and dismissal followed by 
outside succession (Parrino, 1997; Shen and Cannella, 2002). We used this method to simultaneously 
estimate the likelihood of outsider succession and that of insider succession against the base category of 
no dismissal. Specifically, the dependent variable takes the value of 0 for no dismissal, 1 for outside 
succession, and 2 for inside dismissal.8 Appendix shows that there is a significant negative relation (at the 
5% level) between outside succession and firm‐specific knowledge. On the other hand, there is an 
insignificant relation between the likelihood of inside succession and firm‐specific knowledge. We further 
conducted a likelihood‐ratio test of the equality of the coefficients of firm‐specific knowledge in Models 
(1) and (2). The null hypothesis that two coefficients are equal was rejected at the five percent 
significance level. These results suggested that firms with higher firm‐specific knowledge were less likely 
to hire a new CEO externally, which was consistent with your expectation. 
Moreover, we have conducted several complementary analyses.9 One of our current dependent variable is 
the use of restricted stocks in compensation design, which is intended to directly capture the motivation 
for the firm to retain a CEO. Although restricted stocks are generally considered to encourage long‐term 
perspective and increase the incentives for CEOs to stay longer with the firm, some other related 
measures of compensation, such as long‐term compensation, may also capture a similar incentive design 
with an intention to motivate CEOs to stay in a firm. Thus, as a robustness test, we have also run 
regressions using long‐term compensation (which include stock options, restricted stocks, and long‐term 
incentive plans, and other long‐term compensation) as dependent variables. We found largely consistent 
results. 
Another complementary analysis was associated with the measure of our key independent variable, firm 
specificity in knowledge assets. Our current measure is based on patent citation data, which has certain 
limitations. Thus, in additional robustness tests, we constructed an alternative measure of firm‐specific 
knowledge following Hoberg and Phillips (2016), who developed an index of product similarity between 
firms.10 We took the inverse of the similarity index (which is denoted by Product Dissimilarity) as a 
measure of specificity in firm knowledge assets, with the assumption that a firm with products dissimilar 
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to those of other firms is more likely to have a high level of firm‐specificity in knowledge assets. It is 
worth noting that because the Product Dissimilarity variable was skewed, following the literature, we 
used its decile rank from 1 to 10 in the regressions. The main findings appeared to be somewhat weaker, 
but 32 were largely consistent with our main results. 
In addition, our key arguments are based on the proposition that firms with greater firm‐specific 
knowledge is associated with greater need for CEO specialized skills. Although the argument makes 
logical sense, CEO specialized skills is a construct that is not directly measured. Thus, it might be helpful 
to conduct some complementary analyses to confirm this assertion empirically. In particular, we 
examined the correlation between firm‐specific knowledge and CEO organizational tenure, which has 
been used in some previous studies to proxy for CEO specialized skills. We found that the correlation was 
positive and significant (p < 0.001). Although we admit this is a rather crude analysis, it does seem to 
provide some (indirect) evidence consistent with our arguments. 
Finally, we have tried a few alternative empirical models to make sure that our key results were not 
sensitive to model specification. First, in our sample, the number of CEO dismissal cases was relatively 
small (99 out of 4,390 observations). Thus, to make sure that our main results were not biased as a result 
of low dismissal cases, we ran the analyses using alternative regression models that explicitly take into 
consideration of such cases. In particular, we followed King and Zeng’s (2001) procedure to account for 
rare events (implemented by using STATA command “relogit”) and found results that are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 3. In addition, we reran our analyses using the hazard rate model, 
another alternative to the logit model. In particular, we predicted the hazard rate of CEO dismissal using 
Cox proportional hazard regressions. The level of firm‐specific knowledge was found to negatively 
related to CEO dismissal, and moreover, it weakened the negative relationship between firm financial 
performance and CEO dismissal. These results were quite consistent with the main ones using the logit 
model. To evaluate the economic magnitude of the results by exponentiating the reported coefficients, we 
found that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in firm‐specific knowledge was associated with a 35 percent 
lower hazard rate of CEO dismissal during the next year. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study examines the interrelationships between firm resources and top management employment 
arrangements, including CEO compensation design (i.e., restricted stocks) and CEO dismissal. We argue 
that a high level of firm‐specific knowledge is associated with the firm’s greater commitment to its 
existing strategy and practices. Due to a higher need for their CEOs to invest in specialized human 
capital, firms with a higher level of firm‐specific knowledge are likely to encourage their CEOs to stay 
and provide job securities to the CEOs in order to motivate them to acquire specialized skills. 
Accordingly, we argue that firm‐specific knowledge is positively associated with the firms’ use of 
restricted stocks in their CEO compensation design and negatively associated with CEO dismissal. 
Furthermore, we predict and found empirical evidence that firm diversification mitigates the effect of 
firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal as CEOs are more 
removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. 
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To our best knowledge, this study is the first one that integrates resource‐based view of the firm with the 
strategic leadership literature on CEO compensation and CEO succession. By developing theoretical 
arguments and empirically testing the influence of level of firm‐specific knowledge on CEO 
compensation contract design and the likelihood of CEO dismissal, it provides fresh angles to understand 
antecedents of CEO compensation and dynamics of CEO succession. Furthermore, by examining the 
moderating effect of corporate diversification, we further contribute to the literatures by introducing the 
role of firm structure and scope in firms’ employment arrangements for their CEOs. 
In addition to its contribution to the CEO compensation and succession literatures, the study provides new 
insights for the general arguments of agency theory. Agency theory emphasizes the conflicts between 
shareholders and top managers, and how providing appropriate incentives to top managers may help align 
interests among them. Although there are some discussion in the literature on the roles of CEO general 
versus specific human capital (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; Parrino, 1997), it does not address how 
firm resource structure may play a role in affecting the conflicts and interest alignment between 
shareholders and top managers. In particular, when there is a high level of firm‐specific knowledge 
resources, shareholders are likely to grant top managers restricted stocks as part of the compensation 
package and offer managers greater job security. 
This study also contributes to the resource‐based theory of firm literature. While some recent efforts 
extend the theory by emphasizing the role of human factors in the processes of resource accumulation and 
rent generation (Coff, 1997, 1999; Wang et al., 2009), they have primarily focused on the role of key firm 
employees. Relatively less attention has been paid to managerial incentives (with the exception of 
Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001). One important implication that can be drawn from this study is that 
firms with high levels of firm‐specific knowledge are more likely to maintain continuity and commitment 
in all key aspects of firm strategies as shown with a compensation package that encourage CEOs to have a 
longer stay in the firm and lower CEO dismissal. 
This study has some inherent limitations that require future research to advance its key arguments. First, 
although patent data provided rich information about the path of knowledge creation and flow, they only 
encompass one type of organizational knowledge. This leads to some inherent limitations that might raise 
questions about the validity of our measurement of firm‐specific knowledge and constrain the 
interpretation of our results. For example, patent examiners’ contribution to citations listed in issued 
patents could complicate interpretation of findings and raise the concern regarding the extent to which 
patent citations, in general, and self‐citations, particularly, accurately reflect firm knowledge flow (e.g., 
Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Alcácer, Gittelman, and Sampat, 2009). Although we have, as 
supplementary analysis, explored alternative measures of firm‐specific knowledge at both firm‐ and 
industry‐levels, they have their own disadvantages, and are thus not ideal proxies. Future research may 
consider using survey or other field data to explore organizational knowledge and firm‐specificity more 
broadly by including other types of knowledge assets. 
Second, there might be two mechanisms at work, and both may lead to a lower rate of CEO dismissal 
associated with firm‐specific knowledge. The first, which is also our article’s main argument, is that the 
board has a strong intention to make an ex ante commitment to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. On 
the other hand, once the CEO invests in specialized human capital, firms may find that the replacement 
cost is higher. In addition, a higher level of firm‐specific knowledge may promote CEO entrenchment, 
further making herself less likely to be dismissed. Since the replacement cost and the entrenchment power 
effect have been well documented in the prior literature (Crossland and Chen, 2013; Shen and Cannella, 
2002; Zhang, 2008), we do not theoretically emphasize their impact in our article. But we admit that both 
mechanisms may be at play and the current study does not fully distinguish them empirically, despite our 
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efforts to control the effect of CEO power by including variables such as CEO tenure and CEO duality. 
However, our inclusion of the other dependent variable, CEO compensation with restricted stocks, to 
some extent mitigates such a concern as CEO compensation reflects more of an ex ante arrangement. 
Future studies may consider a different research design that helps to tease out these two mechanisms more 
directly. In addition, one implication of our key arguments and findings is that for firms with firm‐specific 
knowledge, the decision to retain rather than dismiss their CEOs should positively affect their financial 
performances. While our study focuses on the antecedents of such a decision, future research may 
examine how firm‐specific knowledge may affect the consequences of retaining versus dismissing CEOs 
in terms of firm performance outcomes. 
Third, as the first study establishing a connection between firm‐knowledge structure and CEO‐
employment arrangement (the extent of compensation with restricted stocks and the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal), this study only looks at one contextual factor—the level of diversification—that moderates our 
proposed relationships. Future studies may examine other internal firm‐level and external environmental 
factors that are expected to influence the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on CEO compensation and 
dismissal. Another interesting area of research would be integrating the effect of managerial incentives 
with that of human biases in order to draw richer managerial implications. For example, studies could 
investigate how escalation of commitment by CEO and/or the board of directors affect CEO 
compensation and the likelihood of dismissal, and how such a bias may influence the role of firm‐specific 
knowledge in CEO compensation and dismissal. 
By pointing out the effects of firm‐knowledge structure on CEO compensation and the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal, via its influence on managerial incentives to make firm‐specific investments, this study 
reemphasizes the importance of strategic commitment and incorporating managerial incentives in 
resource‐based strategic decision making. It is hoped that this study will constitute another step toward a 
better understanding of the effect of knowledge resources on strategic decision making. 
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Table A1. Succession type and FSK‐dismissal relationship 
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